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INTRODUCTION 
The rules of administrative law are 
designed to achieve a balance between 
the goals of fairness to regulated parties 
and of effective, efficient, and economic 
government. Just as the rules of civil 
procedure apply to all lawsuits, the rules 
of administrative law apply to all agen-
cies-regardless of the different sorts of 
regulation in which the agencies are 
engaged. The practical importance of 
administrative law has never been greater: 
administrative adjudication and rule-
making is enormously important to 
society and it touches the lives of us all. 
The California Administrative Proced-
ure Act (APA) 1 was first adopted in 
1945, following a study by the Judicial 
Council.2 Thus it preceded by one year 
the adoption of the federal APA.3 The 
California AP A was a pioneering act 
and, in many respects (such as in the 
creation of a central panel of hearing 
officers), was well ahead of its time. 
However, the Act had limited objectives. 
Because the Judicial Council lacked suf-
ficient time, staff, and budget to make a 
comprehensive study of the problem, it 
recommended a statute that dealt with 
only a portion of administrative adjudica-
tion. 4 It contained provisions about 
judicial review, but these reflected the 
hopeless constitutional muddle relating 
to judicial review at that time. 5 
The AP A provisions relating to rule-
making were completely revised in 1979. 
However, the adjudication and judicial 
review provisions remain, for the most part, 
the same as when they were adopted more 
than forty years ago. I would wager that 
all who practice in the field of Califor-
nia administrative law, whether from the 
government or the private side, would agree 
that the present Act is badly out of date, 
even if they would agree on little else. 
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Since the adoption of the federal 
and state APAs in 1945 and 1946, the 
subject has developed enormously. There 
is a tremendous body of commentary, 
case law, and experience. In particular, 
we can be more confident than was the 
Judicial Council in 1944 that a single, 
well-drafted code of administrative pro-
cedure can comfortably apply to the 
rulemaking and adjudication provisions 
of all agencies. The Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws have adopted sev-
eral model AP As, most recently a state-
of-the-art version in 1981. 6 The time is 
clearly ripe for a new look at California 
administrative law. 
PENDING STUDY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
The California Law Revision Com-
mission has engaged me to prepare a 
study of California administrative law 
and to make recommendations for legis-
lation to modernize California adminis-
trative procedure.7 The first phase of 
the study concerns adjudication. Rule-
making, judicial review, and political 
oversight will follow later. At present, I 
have begun work on this study and hope 
to present a report on at least some 
phases of administrative adjudication by 
the end of the summer of 1989. Ideally, 
the Law Revision Commission will ulti-
mately adopt a set of recommendations 
based on my study and its own analysis 
and conclusions. With the support of as 
many interested groups as possible, the 
Commission will cause them to be intro-
duced in the legislature. 
This article is intended to alert the 
readers of the California Regulatory Law 
Reporter to my study and to the distinct 
possibility that quite substantial chang~s 
in California administrative law will 
come before the legislature in the next 
couple of years. With some luck, Cali-
fornia could well have a new administra-
tive procedure act. 
If you have read this far, this is 
undoubtedly of interest to you. As a 
result, I hope that after reading this 
article you will communicate with me or 
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with the Law Revision Commission. 8 In 
either case, you will be placed on the 
Commission's mailing list so you will be 
updated on the progress of the study. 
More important, I would like to receive 
whatever input you would care to pro-
vide on the issues discussed in this 
article. I would be happy to appear 
before your bar association administra-
tive law committee or at a meeting of 
your agency's members and staff. 
Nobody could be an expert on the 
procedures of all, or even of most, of 
the hundreds of California administra-
tive agencies; I certainly do not claim to 
be. Therefore, to produce recommenda-
tions that deal fairly with the complexity 
and variety of California administrative 
justice without making it more cumber-
some and costly, I will need the help of 
many people inside and outside of the 
agencies. I hope you will be one of those 
who takes an interest in this project. 
The balance of this article surveys 
the issues I intend to cover in the course 
of my study. Each of these issues (and 
many others I will encounter as the 
study proceeds) are live, important issues, 
on which reasonable persons can differ. 
I have not reached a final decision on 
any of them, although I have strong 
views on many of them. But it will be 
necessary to come up with answers to 
all of them before the Law Revision 
Commission can come forward with pro-
posed legislation and before any sort of 
coalition can be assembled that could 
support amendatory legislation. 
This article first asks an overarching 
question: Should California consider 
adopting the 1981 Model Act? If the 
answer to that particular question is no, 
the balance of the article focuses on 
particular issues in need of current study. 
THE 1981 MODEL ACT 
There are obvious reasons why Cali-
fornia should consider the 1981 Model 
Act as a starting point for administrative 
Jaw reform. Although the Act has not 
yet had widespread adoption (Washin~-
ton, Arizona, and Utah have adopted 1t 
2 
in whole or in part), it represents years 
of study and consideration by skilled 
consultants and by the Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. There are ob-
vious reasons to start with a Model Act 
when drafting a California statute: it 
allows California to take advantage of 
the enormous research and drafting in-
vestment made by others and, to the 
extent uniformity is achieved, it makes 
available precedents from other states 
when provisions of the law are drawn 
into question. 
The Model Act contains many innova-
tions in its provisions relating to adjudi-
cation, rulemaking, judicial review, and 
oversight. For example, it provides for a 
set of differing adjudication procedures, 
of varying degrees of formality, depend-
ing on the matter to be resolved. The 
same degree of formality should not be 
required in cases considering whether a 
physician's license should be revoked or 
a student should be suspended from a 
California state college for five days. 
Most important, the Model Act cov-
ers the entire field: public information, 
adjudication, rulemaking, judicial review, 
and legislative and executive oversight 
of agencies. It is an integrated approach 
to protecting the rights of the public 
while achieving economic and efficient 
government and making agencies politic-
ally responsive. It would be a whole 
fresh start for California. This might be 
a better approach than to perform count-
less bits of minor surgery on the existing 
statutory and decisional law which is 
often outdated and confusing. Needless 
to say, however, the Model Act would 
serve only as a starting point. As always, 
California would go its own way and 
strike its own compromises. But the Act 
. would be a good place to begin. 
In the final analysis, it may not make 
much difference where one starts: whether 
one takes the Model Act approach or 
the piecemeal approach, one must study 
existing California law and compare it 
with Model Act provisions in order to 
decide what is best for California. But 
perhaps there is a difference in emphasis 
depending on whether the Model Act or 
the existing law is the starting point. If 
the Model Act is the starting point, one 
might need a stronger justification to 
depart from it than if one takes existing 
law as the starting point. 
PIECEMEAL CHANGES 
In this section I shall briefly address 
a list of problem areas that I have identi-
fied at this stage of my study. These will 
be broken down into the following cate-
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gories of adjudication, rulemaking, 
judicial review, and oversight. 
Adjudication 
A. Should Agencies Adjudicate? One 
fundamental issue of administrative law 
is whether the same agency members 
who prosecute cases should also adjudi-
cate them. Many people feel that it is 
unfair, for example, that a licensing 
agency adopts the rules of practice, em-
ploys staff that investigates violations 
by licensees, prosecutes their cases before 
an administrative law judge (ALJ), then 
makes the final adjudicatory decision. 
Those people advocate various reforms, 
such as making ALJ decisions final; hav-
ing a separate, independent group of 
judges within an agency make the final 
adjudicatory decisions; or having a separ-
ate administrative court to hear appeals 
from ALJ decisions of many agencies. 
Models of this sort can be found in 
various states and the federal government. 
Others feel that it is essential that a 
regulatory agency retain adjudicatory 
power in order to make policy through 
adjudication as well as through rule-
making. They contend that many situa-
tions cannot be anticipated through the 
adoption of rules; the public interest 
requires that agency members be able to 
make new law and policy in particular 
adjudications. They point out that the 
separation of adjudication from policy-
making will inevitably lead to differences 
of opinion and confusion between the 
two different bodies making agency 
policy. And they urge that the legislature 
has placed the political responsibility 
for agency policymaking exclusively upon 
the agency heads. 
Thus, an important issue that must 
be confronted in this study is whether 
there are agencies in which the benefits 
of separating adjudication from other 
agency functions would outweigh the 
costs of doing so. 
B. Coverage. The adjudication pro-
visions of the AP A impose a set of 
standardized fair hearing procedures in 
cases of adjudication (such as license 
revocation). Under present law, the adjudi-
cation provisions apply only to the agen-
cies named in Government Code (herein-
after GC) section 1150 I. Denials or 
revocations of professional licenses ( or 
reprovals to licensees) trigger APA pro-
cedures.9 In other cases an agency's 
authorizing statute requires it to follow 
the APA. 10 A long list of critically 
important California agencies are not 
required to comply with the AP A's adjudi-
cation provisions. To name a few, the 
AP A does not apply to the Public Utili-
ties Commission, the Workers' Compen-
sation Appeals Board, the University of 
California, and the Coastal Commission. 
In some cases, such as the Department 
of Motor Vehicles, certain adjudicatory 
functions of an agency are covered by 
the AP A but additional functions are 
not. By comparison, the rulemaking pro-
visions of the AP A apply to almost all 
agencies. 
Each of the agencies not listed in GC 
section I 1501 has its own procedural 
code spelled out in its own statute, regula-
tions, and customs. As a result, practition-
ers who have a matter before a new 
agency have to learn a new body of 
procedure. Cases relating to a particular 
problem of administrative procedure be-
fore one agency may not be precedents 
when the very same issue arises before 
another agency. Procedural due process 
under the California constitution im-
poses notice and hearing requirements 
in far more situations than does due 
process under the federal constitution. 11 
This maze of adjudicatory requirements 
seems reminiscent of the writ system 
that once guided civil litigation-a differ-
ent set of procedures for tort, contract, 
and property litigation. Most people 
think that progress was made when a 
single code of procedure came to cover 
all civil litigation. 
Historically, the reason that the Act 
covers only certain agencies is that the 
Judicial Council's report was not com-
prehensive. That report covered only 
licensing agencies and, for the most part, 
the adjudication provisions of the AP A 
today cover only licensing functions. 
Under the existing Act, all adjudica-
tory hearings are conducted by ALJs 
from the central panel known as the 
Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH). 12 Thus, the process of APA 
adjudicatory hearings inevitably involves 
a central panel judge. When people dis-
cuss the extension of the AP A to addi-
tional agencies, they often assume that 
this means that all of the agency's hear-
ings would be conducted by OAH ALJs. 
However, it should be possible to de-
couple the ALJ-central panel problem 13 
from the question of whether the AP A 
adjudication procedures should apply to 
an agency's proceedings. The AP A could 
cover an agency's adjudication even 
though the agency employs its own hear-
ing officers or does not use hearing 
officers at all. 
The issue to be studied is whether 
the AP A should supply adjudication pro-
cedures for all state agencies that engage 
in adjudication (unless the legislature 
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specifically decides to exclude them). 
C. Adjudications Covered. The adjudi-
cation provisions of the AP A apply in 
cases where a right, authority, license, 
or privilege should be revoked, suspend-
ed, limited, or conditioned; or should be 
granted, issued, or renewed; or where a 
licensee is publicly reproved. 14 But there 
are many administrative adjudications 
that might not be covered by this listing 
(such as assessment of a civil money 
penalty or fixing rates for a regulated 
industry). 15 Should the adjudication pro-
visions of the AP A apply to every ad-
judication? 
D. Formality of Hearing. The APA 
provides for only a single, relatively 
formal trial-type procedure regardless of 
the nature of the issue and the serious-
ness of the matters to be resolved. The 
same elaborate procedure would apply 
to hearings at which there is a dispute of 
material fact (such as the negligence of a 
licensee) and a hearing at which the 
only issue concerns the exercise of dis-
cretion or the interpretation of regula-
tions. The same formalities attend the 
revocation of a pharmacist's license and 
the imposition of an extremely minor 
sanction. There is no specific provision 
for emergencies-when an agency must 
act before providing procedures. Under 
the 1981 Model Act, there is a gradation 
of procedures depending on the issue to 
be resolved and the seriousness of the 
sanction; there is provision for confer-
ence hearings, summary hearings, and 
emergency hearings. 16 For example, a 
conference hearing is used if there is no 
issue of material fact to be resolved. 
Should California Jaw also provide for 
less formal procedures when that is ap-
propriate? 
E. Separation of Functions. The issue 
of "separation of functions" assumes that 
a single agency combines several func-
tions-rulemaking, prosecution, and 
adjudication. 17 It addresses the question 
of whether the same staff member may 
engage both in adversary functions (such 
as prosecution, investigation, or advo-
cacy) and adjudicatory functions (such 
as deciding cases or advising adjudica-
tory decisionmakers). For example, may 
the person who prosecutes the agency's 
case (whether from the agency staff or 
the Attorney General's staff) also give 
off-the-record advice to the members of 
the agency who make the ultimate de-
cision in the case? If not, which staff 
members may the adjudicators consult? 
California law contains no provision 
on separation offunctions18 and the prac-
tice seems to vary considerably. The 
Model Act and federal APA do contain 
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provisions on separation of functions.1 9 
Given that agencies have responsibility 
for both prosecution and adjudication 
of cases, proper separation of functions 
is an essential element of fair administra-
tive procedure. Should California law 
include a provision on separation of 
functions? 
F. Ex Parte Contacts. California law 
prohibits ex parte (i.e., off the record) 
contacts by any person (either inside or 
outside the agency) with a presiding 
officer.20 
This provision seems too narrow 
since it does not prohibit ex parte con-
tacts by or from agency decisionmakers 
above the ALJ level (for example, by 
the agency heads when they decide ap-
peals). Moreover, it applies only to those 
agencies listed in GC section 11501. 
Should not all persons in the decision-
making chain, including adjudicatory 
advisers, be forbidden to receive ex parte 
contacts from persons outside the agency? 
And should not the ex parte rules apply 
to all agency adjudication, whether or 
not it is otherwise subject to APA adjudi-
catory rules?21 
On the other hand, the provision 
may be too restrictive in the sense that it 
may deny needed technical assistance to 
decisionmakers (either ALJs or agency 
heads) from agency staff members who 
have not been involved in the case.22 
G. Administrative Law Judges. At 
present, California, like about a dozen 
other states, has a partial central panel 
system.23 Many adjudications are con-
ducted by the twenty or so central panel 
ALJs who are assigned to an agency on 
a case-by-case basis by the Office of 
Administrative Hearings. However, a 
vast amount of adjudication is not cov-
ered by the central panel system because 
many agencies employ their own ALJs. 
Federal agencies and the majority of 
agencies in other states employ their 
own ALJs; there is no central panel. 
The question of whether the central 
panel approach should be extended to 
more agencies, or to all agencies, is diffi-
cult. On the one hand, it is clear that 
perceptions of fairness are enhanced 
when an ALJ does not work for the 
agency that is prosecuting the case. ALJs 
themselves might like the variety of hear-
ing different cases rather than similar 
ones day after day. On the other hand, 
there are significant advantages in having 
ALJs specialize and become experts in 
the work of a single agency. It would be 
costly, for example, to educate an ALJ 
from scratch in the economics of public 
utility regulation each time the PUC 
undertakes a new ratemaking case. 
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Should California move to a system 
in which central-panel ALJs are used 
for all adjudications unless the legislature 
specifically provides that they shall not 
be used? Should the present system 
whereby agencies are billed for their use 
of central-panel judges be continued? Is 
there a compromise approach under 
which ALJs could work for a central 
panel but continue to hear the cases 
from only a single agency? 
H. Proposed Decisions. At present, 
when an ALJ conducts a hearing, the 
ALJ prepares a "proposed decision." If 
an agency does not adopt the ALJ's 
decision (or decides to reduce the penalty 
and adopt the balance of the decision), 
the agency must provide an opportunity 
for all parties to present oral or written 
argument before the agency itseJf.24 
Some people believe that in writing their 
final decisions, agencies too frequently 
overturn the decisions of ALJs on credi-
bility issues. Should the law make the 
ALJ's credibility determinations final? 
Or provide that credibility findings may 
be overturned only in cases in which the 
ALJ's decision is a clear error of judg-
ment? Are there other ways in which the 
process of decision in appeals from ALJ 
decisions should be improved? 
I. Discovery. At present, California 
provides for only limited forms of pre-
hearing discovery.25 These provisions 
allow a party to obtain the names and 
addresses of witnesses, make a copy of 
various statements and reports in the 
agency's files, and take depositions of 
persons who will not be available at the 
hearing. Some agencies provide for more 
extensive discovery practice. 
Some practitioners complain that they 
need better discovery in order properly 
to prepare their cases. However, there is 
a real concern that extensive discovery 
could bog down agency adjudication, 
much as it has done in civil litigation. 
Thus, the issue is whether some or all of 
the rules of civil discovery should apply 
in administrative cases. 
J. Hearsay Evidence. Although any 
evidence is admissible in administrative 
proceedings (if it is of the sort that 
responsible persons rely on in serious 
affairs), hearsay evidence is not sufficient 
in itself to support a finding. 26 In admin-
istrative law this is called the "residuum 
rule." It has been rejected by the 1981 
Model Act, the federal courts, and many 
states. Some people feel the residuum 
rule is an essential protection against 
sloppy agency practice. Others feel that 
technical rules of evidence have no place 
in administrative practice. Should Cali-
fornia dispense with the residuum rule? 
3 
4 
K. Official Notice. Official notice may 
be taken by agency decisionmakers only 
of generally accepted technical or scien-
tific matters within the agency's special 
field or of facts which may be judicially 
noticed by courts.27 Parties must be in-
formed of any matters to be officially 
noticed and given a change to rebut. 
Federal law and the 1981 Model Act 
permit much broader official notice. 
Should California broaden the matters 
which may be the subject of official 
notice? 
L. Burden of Proof Ordinarily the 
burden of proof in administrative pro-
ceedings is the same as in civil litigation-
preponderance of the evidence. However, 
an agency must prove its case "by clear 
and convincing evidence to a reasonable 
certainty" in revoking or suspending a 
professional license. 28 Should the pre-
ponderance of the evidence rule be re-
stored in all cases of administrative 
adjudication? 
M. Contempt. Traditionally, it was 
thought that an agency lacked the power 
to hold persons in contempt; only a 
court could do so. However, constitu-
tional agencies in California have the 
contempt power.29 Should any agencies 
have the contempt power? Should all 
agencies have that power? 
N. Settlement. Some ALJs have indi-
cated that administrative adjudication might 
be improved if they had enhanced power 
to encourage settlements. Should any 
changes be made to encourage settlements? 
Rulemaking 
A. Required Rulemaking. Agencies 
generally have discretion to make policy 
either through case-by-case adjudication 
or through rulemaking. Most people 
would agree that it is clearly preferable 
that law and policy be made through 
rulemaking rather than adjudication, al-
though it is not always possible to do 
so. The Model Act contains some import-
ant provisions that require an agency to 
set forth appropriate standards, princi-
ples, and procedural safeguards in the 
form of rules "as soon as feasible and to 
the extent practicable." Similarly, an 
agency must adopt rules to supersede 
the principles of law or policy previously 
adopted in adjudications "as soon as 
feasible and to the extent practicable. "30 
These provisions would tilt the balance 
sharply toward rulemaking and away 
from adjudication. Should California 
adopt some kind of required rulemaking 
provision? 
B. Interpretive Rules. California no-
tice and comment rulemaking procedures 
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apply even to rules that are strictly inter-
pretive (such as explanatory bulletins) if 
they are of general applicability. 31 Fed-
eral law does not require notice and 
comment for interpretive rules or policy 
statements. The 1981 Model Act strikes 
a compromise position. It requires notice 
and comment procedures when a state 
legislature has delegated power to the 
agency to make the interpretation in the 
form of a legislative rule. Where an 
agency validly adopts an interpretive rule 
without notice and comment (because it 
has no legislative rulemaking power), a 
reviewing court is not permitted to pay 
it deference.32 California law may be 
unrealistic and is probably often ignored 
in practice (because most agencies issue 
masses of interpretive communications). 
Should California adopt some exception 
for interpretive rules and policy statements? 
C. Good Cause Exception. The ordin-
ary notice and comment procedures may 
be dispensed with in the event of emer-
gencies. 33 However, federal and state 
acts usually contain a somewhat broader 
exemption, allowing an agency to dis-
pense with notice and comment proced-
ures upon a finding of good cause be-
cause the procedures are unnecessary, 
impracticable, or contrary to the public 
interest. This is considerably broader 
than the "emergency" standard. Should 
California broaden the exemptions from 
notice and comment rulemaking to take 
account of situations other than emer-
gencies? 
D. Office of Administrative Law 
(OAL). California provides for review 
of most agency rules by the OAL on the 
grounds of necessity, authority, clarity, 
reference, nonduplication, and consist-
ency with other law or regulation.J4 
Although OAL review is relatively new, 
it may not be premature to ask whether 
the system serves the public interest. 35 
Does OAL review improperly encourage 
non-experts to second-guess judgments 
of agency experts? Should OAL review 
be narrowed or dispensed with in favor 
of other oversight mechanisms? 
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
Federal agencies have experimented suc-
cessfully with negotiated rulemaking. In 
these proceedings, all affected parties get 
together and negotiate a satisfactory rule; 
then it is proposed for public comment. 
Should California statutes permit or encour-
age alternate methods to formulate rules? 
Judicial Review 
A. Scope of Review. For unique his-
torical reasons, the factual findings of 
California agencies are frequently subject 
to judicial review under an "independent 
judgment" standard (rather than the 
more conventional "substantial evidence" 
standard).36 Independent judgment re-
view applies to the findings of non-
constitutional agencies that affect "vest-
ed, fundamental rights." 
There are some definite problems 
with independent judgment. A great deal 
of ink has been spilled trying to decide 
whether a particular private interest is 
"vested" or "fundamental." Another dis-
advantage is that independent judgment 
review significantly increases a person's 
chances of success in the courts; it is 
probably not good public policy to en-
courage people to appeal cases in which 
substantial evidence supports the agency's 
fact findings. In addition to the confusion 
that attends the distinction between inde-
pendent judgment and substantial evi-
dence review, there is a deeper concern: 
independent judgment review might cause 
non-specialist judges to second-guess the 
findings of expert agency members in ways 
that do not promote good government.37 
On the other hand, many people in 
California are devoted to the independ-
ent judgment test. They feel it provides 
essential protection for the ordinary citi-
zen who is up against a clumsy and 
unfeeling administrative bureaucracy. It 
provides a bulwark against sloppy admin-
istrative procedure or agencies that are 
biased or captured by the industries they 
regulate. Should California dispense with 
independent judgment review? 
B. Exhaustion of Remedies. A party 
must exhaust administrative remedies be-
fore going to court. The exhaustion rule 
is presently non-statutory and subject to 
considerable confusion.JS The Model Act 
spells out the principles that help courts 
decide when the exhaustion requirement 
applies. 39 Should California have a simi-
lar statute? 
C. Court in which Review Occurs. 
Most judicial review occurs in the su-
perior court under the writ of mandate 
procedure.40 However, decisions of the 
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board 
are initially reviewed in the court of 
appeals, and decisions of the Sate Bar 
and the Public Utilities Commission are 
initially reviewed in the Supreme Court. 
Should these aberrations be abolished? 
At what level should judicial review 
occur? Should there be a special court 
entrusted with judicial review of agency 
action? 
Non-Judicial Controls 
A. Oversight. Aside from the execu-
tive branch Office of Administrative Law 
that reviews agency rules, discussed 
above, California has no institutionalized 
I 
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means of conducting oversight. The 198 I 
Model Act provides for both gubernator-
ial and legislative review of rules. 41 It 
also requires a regulatory analysis (cost 
benefit analysis) of rules in certain situa-
tions.42 Should California redesign its 
system of oversight of administrative 
rules to include any or all of these insti-
tutional checks and balances? 
B. Ombudsperson. In many agencies 
and in some states there are ombuds-
people empowered to look into com-
plaints about poor administration and 
try to correct them; generally, an om-
budsperson has no formal powers. Should 
California have an ombudsperson who 
can look into complaints arising out of 
agency action? 
C. Administrative Conference. The 
Administrative Conference of the United 
States is an independent federal agency 
that studies administrative law problems 
and makes recommendations to the agen-
cies or the legislature about improve-
men ts. It has worked well at small 
expense. Should California have an Ad-
ministrative Conference? 
CONCLUSION 
As is evident from the foregoing, 
many burning issues of California admin-
istrative Jaw deserve careful study. Some 
of these issues are of major public im-
portance. Other issues are of lesser 
magnitude, but every one bears directly 
on the fundamental question of whether 
it is possible to improve the quality of 
administrative justice in California. 
Toward that end, I hope that everyone 
who makes his or her living from admin-
istrative practice in California will take 
an interest in this pending study and in 
the legislative activity that hopefully will 
follow it. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. Now codified in Government Code 
§§ 11340-11528. 
2. See generally Clarkson, The His-
tory of the California · Administrative 
Procedure Act, 15 Hast. L.J. 237 (1964). 
3. Now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 551 et 
seq. 
4. California Judicial Council, Tenth 
Biennial Report 9-10 (1944). 
5. Id. at 26-28. 
6. See 14 Uniform Laws Annotated 
(1989 Supp.) (hereinafter cited as "1981 
Model Act"). 
7. The Commission was authorized 
by the legislature to study "whether there 
should be changes in administrative Jaw." 
SCR 12 (Lockyer) (1987 Res. Ch. 47). 
8. The address of the California Law 
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Revision Commission is 4000 Middle-
field Road, Suite D-2, Palo Alto, CA 
94303. Its telephone number is (415) 
494-1335. 
9. Business and Professions Code 
§§ 485,495. 
IO. See California Continuing Edu-
cation of the Bar, California Adminis-
trative Hearing Practice 41-122 ( I 989 
Supp.) (list of all agency functions with 
guide to whether APA applies). 
I I. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 
260 (1979). 
12. Government Code§ I 1502. 
13. See infra discussion in subpart G. 
14. Government Code §§ I 1503, 
11504; Business and Professions Code 
§ 495. 
15. See Government Code§ 11500(1) 
(defining adjudication broadly to include 
any "resolution of an issue pertaining to 
an individual''). 
I 6. 198 I Model Act, supra note 6, 
§§ 4-401 to -403, 4-501 to -506. 
17. See supra subpart A concerning 
whether agencies should adjudicate. 
18. The provision on ex parte con-
tacts, discussed infra in subpart F, deals 
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